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Abstract 
 
Since the 2010s we witness the rise of populism and nationalism as part of a reaction against the 
global policies of the last 30 years in Western liberal democracies and beyond. This article seeks 
to unpack the rise of populism and nationalism and its relationship to social media. We begin by 
reviewing the relevant literature relating to the globalization paradigm and assesses how it has 
influenced communication studies. The rise of the globalization theory coincides with key 
advancements in the post-Cold War world, such as the growth of international trade, the global 
movement of people, the increase in the number of international laws and forums, economic 
liberalism, as well as the rise of the internet and global digital communication networks. But while 
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the global era denotes a cosmopolitan vision, economic insecurity, growing inequality in wealth 
distribution, as well as cultural change and shifts in traditional values and norms have brought 
about a broader concern that globalization is associated with a shift of power to transnational elites, 
whose impact upon common people’s life and experiences are not fully acknowledged. 
Contemporary populism has been associated with nationalism, but also with the active use of social 
media platforms as alternative communication sites to mainstream media which is seen as having 
been captured by elite consensus politics. This complicates the relationship between truth and free 
expression in an age of social media, meaning that we need to account for the role of such platforms 
in the rise of populism and ‘post-truth’ politics, as well as its scope to advance the goals and 
strategies of progressive social movements.  
 
Keywords 
 
Populism; nationalism; globalisation; social media; post-truth; fake news; un-celebrity.  
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Introduction 
 
Western democracies are in in a state of flux. From the Brexit vote to the victory of Donald Trump 
in the US Presidential elections, through to the assortment of populist parties across the world, the 
spread of populist and associated nationalist movements suddenly seems unstoppable. There are 
populisms of both the political left (SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, the Jeremy Corbyn 
movement in the UK) and the political right (Donald Trump in the USA, UKIP and The Brexit 
Party in the UK, France’s National Front, the Swedish Democratic Party, the Party for Freedom in 
The Netherlands, the Alternative for Germany – AfD, Austria’s Freedom Party, Vox in Spain, 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in Australia, and others). Alongside this development, the nation-
state is resurfacing as the primary vehicle of political life. Multinational institutions (EU, WTO) 
and multilateral trade treaties (NAFTA/TLC) are being challenged because they are seen by some 
as not serving the national interest. Nation-states have certainly seen their capacity to govern 
undermined by the globalisation process, leading some scholars to pursue the ‘declining state’ 
thesis, but some others claim that national governments still retain key policy instruments to 
achieve many economic and political objectives (Iosifidis, 2016).  
 
But it is not merely Western democracies that harness nationalism, for traces of this trend can be 
found in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other developing 
countries.The rise in power of Jair Bolsanaro’s Partido Liberal Social – PSL in Brazil is a recent 
example. In this article, we wish to debate the challenges that regional integration and globalisation 
face due to the rise of nationalism. There are numerous possible explanations for the rise of 
nationalism, populism, authoritarianism, and intolerance in opposition to cosmopolitanism. These 
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range from economic reasons (the global economic slowdown), inequality, psychological accounts 
(pessimism, nostalgia, and the belief that things were better in the past), support for ‘authoritarian 
personalities’ as political leaders, and immigration and discomfort with strangers, all of which 
lower support for globalisation.  
 
The article also examines the role of new-media tools in spreading nationalistic as opposed to 
cosmopolitan views. In addition to opening up opportunities for dialogue and difference (see 
Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2016), new communication tools such as Twitter and Facebook can bypass 
the mainstream media’s frequently liberal-cosmopolitan stance and allow people to talk to each 
other directly, organise in groups and rallies and accelerate the spread of nationalism. Politicians 
like then UKIP leader Nigel Farage in the UK also take advantage of these new media to get 
through their nationalistic, anti-immigrant messages and capture popular fears that the nation may 
not survive an influx of foreigners (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2018). Worse, social media has been 
associated with the spread of so-called ‘post-truth politics’ and ‘fake news’ and this article 
contributes to the discussion of combating disinformation and better profiling ‘real news’ outlets 
as an alternative to fake and chaotic information sources.  
 
Rise and Fall of the Globalisation Paradigm 
 
The globalisation paradigm has been highly influential in communication studies, and the social 
sciences generally, since the 1990s. It is characteristically difficult to define, having both an 
empirical dimension, referring to identifiable trends in global interactions (trade and investment 
flows, internet connectivity, number of international government and non-government 
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organisations, multilateral agreements and international institutions etc.), and a normative 
dimension, that refers to transformations in culture, identity, political and symbolic power, and the 
relative strength of nationalist and cosmopolitan ideas. While it is true that “there is no single 
theory of globalisation that commands common assent” (Sparks, 2007: 126), there are sufficient 
commonalities among key theorists in the field that one can refer to a paradigm that stands in 
contrast to other approaches to international communications, such as modernisation theories and 
critical political economy (Sparks, 2007; AUTHORS).  
 
There has been empirical evidence supporting globalisation claims, as the world has seen greater 
global economic integration over the last three decades. Foreign investment grew at three times 
the rate of global GDP between 1990s and 2015, and world trade as a percentage of global GDP 
grew from 30 per cent of global GDP in 1973 to 70 per cent in 2018 (AUTHORS; World Bank, 
2019). Global supply chains and infrastructure are also far more integrated than they were in the 
1990s due to transformations in transport and communication, and there is deep recognition of 
global brands. Importantly, as of 2019, six of the world’s top ten global brands in the 
communications media and information technology space are: Apple (#1), Google (#2), Amazon 
(#3), Microsoft (#4), Samsung (#6) and Facebook (#9) (Interbrand, 2019).  
 
At the same time, we need to be careful when using aggregate figures as metrics of globalisation. 
A considerable part of world trade and investment is regional rather than global: it occurs among 
nation-states within Europe, Asia and the Americas, rather than across the globe.  Alan Rugman 
argued that, rather than extending their operations over a ‘flat world’ (e.g. Friedman, 2005), most 
of the world’s largest companies pursue international expansion through regionalization rather 
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than globalisation, and that multilateral trade agreements have for the most part facilitated such 
regionalization (Rugman and Oh, 2008). The economic geographer Peter Dicken has also proposed 
that the vast majority of the world’s largest companies are “national corporations with international 
operations (i.e. foreign subsidiaries)” rather than truly global corporations “whose geographically-
dispersed operations are functionally integrated” (Dicken, 2003: 30).  
 
An example of the challenges of global expansion has been seen with Apple. After long having 
had its products largely manufactured in China, Apple products were a huge success when they 
first became widely available for retail in China in the late 2000s, due to the reputation of the 
global brand and their superior quality to the lower-cost Chinese-made digital devices. Over the 
course of a decade, however, Chinese phone makers such as Huawei, Xiaomi and others have 
caught up and perhaps surpassed Apple in terms of product innovation, while capturing market 
share due to lower prices and better understanding of Chinese consumers. While Apple retains a 
highly significant market presence in China, and its products still carry considerable cachet with 
middle-class Chinese consumers, there has been a substantial catch-up by the local competitors in 
this fast-growing market, and Apple carries the disadvantage of being branded as an ‘American’ 
cultural product.  
 
The accelerated global uptake of the internet and digital media, and its profoundly disruptive 
impact upon all aspects of media and communication, have been a central feature of the period 
from the 1990s to the present. The number of internet users was estimated at 4.1 billion (53 per 
cent of the world’s population) by 2018, with the fastest rates of growth being in the developing 
world. Among this digitally networked population, 3.2 billion (42 per cent) were social media 
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users, and 2.95 billion (39 per cent) were active mobile social media users. The most widely used 
social media platforms in 2018 were Facebook (2.2 billion users), YouTube (1.5 billion users), 
WhatsApp and Fb Messenger (both with 1.3 billion users), and WeChat (980 million users) (We 
Are Social, 2018).  
 
Rather than seeing global communication technologies as leading to an increasingly homogeneous 
global culture, globalisation theorists stressed how new forms of interconnectedness across 
boundaries enabled transformations in media, culture and politics. Greater awareness of people 
and events in other parts of the world, and a capacity to form alliances, allegiances, and 
communities of shared interest across geographical and territorial boundaries, promotes “the 
extension and intensification of social relations and consciousness across world-time and world-
space” (Steger, 2009: 15). A key area in which global ICTs have had a major impact has been upon 
politics, where emergent forms of networked politics, based on what Bennett and Segerberg (2012) 
termed a “logic of connective action”, that has enabled new forms of political mobilisation outside 
of, and often in opposition to, the established political institutions (c.f. Castells, 2012).  
 
The cumulative impacts of economic and cultural globalisation, driven by international trade and 
commerce and by digital communication networks, are seen as three-fold upon culture and 
identity. First, globalisation enables a pluralisation of cultures and identities, through global media 
and communication flows, large-scale migration and the formation of diasporic identities. 
Tomlinson (2007: 364) observed that, far from destroying distinctive cultures and identities, 
“globalisation has been perhaps the most significant force in creating and proliferating cultural 
identity”. Second, the pluralisation of cultures and identities is linked to the growing 
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deterritorialisation of culture, or “the integration of distant events, processes and relationships into 
our everyday lives … [and] the “‘weakening’ of the traditional ties between cultural experience 
and geographical territory” (Tomlinson, 2007: 360-1). Third, this entails a weakening of the ties 
between national culture and identity, as “many individuals have acquired a pluri-national sense 
of self” (Scholte, 2005: 231), while these individuals also increasingly adopt non-territorial or 
supra-territorial frameworks of collective identity, not bound to nation-states as the primary 
referent: 
 
Whereas national identities involved attachment to a particular homeland, other aspects of 
being such as age, bodily condition, class, faith, gender, profession, race, sexual 
orientation, and belonging to the human species itself are not bound to territorial location 
(Scholte, 2005: 240).  
 
Such developments can be seen with the rise of global environmentalism, transnational movements 
around race, gender and sexuality (e.g. #metoo, Black Lives Matter, marriage equality), the 
growing global coordination of religious and faith-based movements, and transnational rights and 
social justice campaigns. The spread of global media and cultural forms has enabled the rise of 
non-territorial forms of cultural identity, and the global internet has also provided new ways in 
which such identities can be developed, shaped, co-ordinated, networked and struggled for. There 
has also been the resurgence of small nation nationalisms, such as the Catalan and Scottish 
independence movements, where ‘stateless nations’ can draw upon the resources of global media 
to expand awareness of and support for their campaigns to be recognised as independent nations.  
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At the same time, we need to be careful not to overstate the degree of global mobility of most of 
the world’s population – international migrants still account for about 3 per cent of the world’s 
population (Berg and Besharov, 2016) – or the extent to which people freely abandon national 
identities in favour of the ‘global supermarket’ of cosmopolitan identities (Mathews, 2000). 
Nation-states themselves take different approaches to cultural pluralism, with some embracing 
diversity and multiculturalism, and others maintaining strict hierarchies between the dominant 
culture and those of recent migrants. But all nation-states continue to invest heavily in the 
institutions, ceremonies and rituals through which cultural identities are conferred, and even when 
hybrid identities are adopted (Chinese-Australian, Latino-American, British Muslim etc.), there is 
a push and pull between host and homeland identities that does not in itself negate the idea of 
nationhood.  
 
It has been a commonplace of globalisation theorists to argue that the nation-state is in decline, 
experiencing a crisis of sovereignty and diminished capacity to govern on behalf of its citizens, in 
the face of the internationalisation of capital, crises of legitimacy, the rise of multilateral 
agreements and supra-state institutions, and global civil society operating in an increasingly 
transnational public sphere. Steger (2009: 9) defined globality as “a social condition characterized 
by tight global economic, political, cultural, and environmental connections and flows that make 
most of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant”, while Hardt and Negri (2000: 
306) argued that the current phase of global capitalism was one where “large transnational 
corporations have effectively surpassed the jurisdiction and authority of nation-states”. This does 
not entail the disappearance of nation-states; rather, they become what Giddens termed “‘shell 
institutions’ … inadequate to the tasks they are called upon to perform” (Giddens, 2002: 44). 
10 
 
 
It is very apparent that the size of nation-states has not declined over the last 30 years, as the share 
of government spending as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively constant over this period 
across OECD nations, albeit with significant fluctuations within countries and differences between 
countries (OECD, 2019). Whether there has been a decline in the effectiveness of government 
interventions, and hence a loss of sovereignty vis-à-vis global forces, is a complex, 
multidimensional question. It was noted earlier that most corporations are primarily national rather 
than truly global, giving nation-states significant potential leverage points over their operations. In 
contrast to the ‘powerless state’ thesis, nation-states often actively promote globalisation of ‘their’ 
national economies, in order to enhance the global competitiveness of key national businesses 
(Weiss, 1997). More generally, and picking up upon the historical account developed by Mann 
(1997) and others, the concept of the nation-state encapsulates a range of institutions and functions, 
meaning that while globalisation may weaken state capacity in some areas (e.g. an autonomous 
macroeconomic policy), it may act to strengthen it in others (e.g. stronger educational institutions 
able to conduct world-leading research and attract international students).  
 
While a weakening of nation-states and territorial sovereignty could be seen as a source of crisis 
in the global system (Streeck, 2017), globalisation theorists tended to take the more positive view 
that cosmopolitan identities and emergent global civil society movements are filling the political 
vacuum, raising the possibility of what Habermas (2001: 94) termed ‘post-national’ citizen 
identities, that could counter the ‘neoliberal’ vision of an unconstrained global merket with a 
politics “to follow the lead of the markets by constructing supranational political agencies”.  Beck 
(2007: 166) proposed that “in an era of global crises, national problems can only be solved through 
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transnational/national cooperation and state networks”, while Kaldor (2003: 12) identified global 
civil society as a movement for “democratizing globalisation”, and Held (1997: 310) proposed a 
cosmopolitan democracy “where citizens must come to enjoy multiple citizenships.”  
 
There is some empirical evidence to support aspects of the global civil society argument. The 
number of active international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) is now estimated at about 
38,000 worldwide, and there have been experiments with multi-stakeholderism and engagement 
of INGOs in global governance frameworks, such as the World Summit on the Information 
Society. But with the notable exception of the European Union – which itself experienced 
significant turmoil in the 2010s – their significance pales against that of multilateral agreements 
framed within the system of nation-states, and the claim that cosmopolitan arguments are 
advancing within national polities is thrown into question with the rise of national populism. 
Indeed, INGOs and civil society group have often been targeted by populists who accuse them of 
being tools of cosmopolitan elites. The civil society movement also faces the challenge that while 
it can claim to advance accountability and transparency within institutions of national and 
international governance, its claims to democratising global governance are undercut by the fact 
that its own leaderships are not democratically elected, a point often made by critics of such 
organisations. 
 
Populism, Nationalism and Globalisation 
 
It has by now become a commonplace to observe the rise of populism in the 2010s as part of a 
backlash against the policies of the last 30 years in Western liberal democracies, the perceived 
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bipartisanship of the established political parties and political and economic elites generally 
(including media elites), and rising inequalities and a sense of being disconnected from 
governmental decision-making. In Europe, populist political parties now attract about 25 per cent 
of votes in elections in European states, as compared to about 5-7 per cent in the 1990s (Lewis, 
Clarke, Barr et. al., 2018), and a growing number of political leaders are being identified as being 
populists. Inglehart and Norris (2016) attributed the rise of new populist parties in Europe 
primarily to cultural factors, such as a backlash against multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, but 
others such as Judis (2016) and McKnight (2018) have associated populism with an economic 
backlash against rising inequalities, and what they see as 30 years of centre-left parties 
accommodating themselves to neoliberal globalisation under the guise of the ‘Third Way’. Ruccio 
(2018) has noted that globalisation was accompanied by growing income and wealth inequalities 
in the United States, with the share of income held by the top 1 per cent of the population rising 
largely in parallel with the growth in trade as a percentage of U.S. GDP. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) have attributed the rise of national populism to what they term the 
‘Four D’s’: 
 
1. Distrust of political elites, anger at corruption, and perceived exclusion from the 
institutions of liberal democracy; 
2. Deprivation, in the face of rising economic inequalities, stagnant real wages, job insecurity 
and declining social provision; 
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3. Destruction – real or perceived – of national cultures and traditions, value systems and 
authority structures, and historically embedded ‘ways of life’; 
4. Dealignment of citizens as voters from the major political parties, and from the class and 
other societal cleavages associated with those parties.  
 
Goodwin has observed that: 
 
Each national populist party has its own local particularities but there are common themes. 
In the aggregate, national populists oppose or reject liberal globalisation, mass immigration 
and the consensus politics of recent times. They promise instead to give voice to those who 
feel that they have been neglected, if not held in contempt, by increasingly distant elites 
(Goodwin, 2018).  
 
A defining feature of contemporary populism has been its association with nationalism, often 
counterposed to an ideology of globalism. When populist leaders speak of the legitimate authority 
of ‘the people’, in opposition to ‘the elites’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017) they are referring to a 
national people with its own defining history, culture and identity that is largely coextensive with 
the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Addressing the Conservative Political Action 
Committee on 25 February 2017, shortly after becoming U.S. President, Donald Trump 
highlighted the extent to which he saw his presidency as being about serving national interests, 
rather than advancing global priorities: 
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Global cooperation, dealing with other countries, getting along with other countries is 
good, it’s very important. But there is no such thing as a global anthem, a global currency 
or a global flag. This is the United States of America that I’m representing. I’m not 
representing the globe, I’m representing your country. (Trump, 2017) 
 
The Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro said that the lessons he had learned from the British 
wartime leader Winston Churchill included “patriotism, love for your fatherland, respect for your 
flag – something that has been lost over the last few years here in Brazil” (Phillips, 2018). 
Addressing the Valdai Summit in Sochi in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin observed that 
“The biggest nationalist in Russia is me. But the most correct nationalism is to line up actions and 
policies so that it goes for the good of the people” (Yandex News, 2014). At the National Heroes’ 
Day commemorations of August 28, 2017, The Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte urged 
Filipinos to “emulate the patriotism of our heroes … [and] join the government in building a 
stronger nation that is capable of providing a better life for its people” (Duterte, 2017). 
 
Populist nationalism tends to be seen as an ideology of the political right, by both its advocates 
(Bannon, 2018) and its opponents (Lloyd, 2018; Kenny, 2018). But there is also a left-populism, 
albeit one that competes with more anti-populist positions that identify populism primarily with 
the nationalist right, and as a movement that the left needs to fight, in the name of defending and 
extending the principles of liberal democracy. Taking the anti-populist view, Müller (2016: 102) 
argued that populists are “a real danger to democracy”, while Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 118) 
observed that “populism often asks the right questions but provides the wrong answer”.  By 
contrast, the case for left-populism as argued by Judis (2016), McKnight (2018) and Mouffe (2018) 
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proposes that the populist upsurge is based on widespread disillusion with ‘politics-as-usual’, and 
the perception that major parties had reached a consensus around major policy questions, 
particularly in the economic sphere. Mouffe (2018: 1) argues that “we are witnessing a crisis of 
the neoliberal hegemonic formation and this crisis opens the possibility for the construction of a 
more democratic order”, but also that “so many socialist and social-democratic parties are in 
disarray because they stick to an inadequate conception of politics”. For Mouffe (2018: 17), the 
rise of populism is a response to what she terms ‘post-democracy’ where “politics has become a 
mere issue of managing the established order, a domain reserved for experts, and popular 
sovereignty has been declared obsolete.” Mouffe identifies populism as the means through which 
parties of the left can offer a more ambitious program of radical and pluralist democracy. At the 
same time, Mouffe (2018: 71) argues that a left populist political strategy is of necessity also a 
national one as “the hegemonic struggle to recover democracy needs to start at the level of the 
nation state that, despite having lost many of its prerogatives, is still one of the crucial spaces for 
the exercise of democracy and popular sovereignty”.  
 
Populism and Social Media 
 
The online forums or social spaces of the Web 2.0 (a nascent movement towards a more interactive 
and collaborative web as it provides a platform for online social participation in communities of 
interest) differ substantially from the traditional media such as that of public service broadcasting 
in a number of ways: first, they attract many more people than traditional media (see statistics 
above). Second, social networks allow more interactivity and many-to-many communication on a 
global scale, rather than one-to-many as it is the case with broadcast media. Third, the rapid uptake 
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of the global distribution platforms dramatically lowers the costs of reaching international 
audiences, and makes all content potentially accessible worldwide, for instance through reposting 
and retweeting by online user communities. Thus online activity facilitates the creation of 
communities by dropping the costs of cooperation and the creation of new publics (Howard and 
Hussain, 2013).  
 
This has been particularly true during social protests and uprisings. The social uses of networks, 
and indeed their value in organised political protest and rebellion - the enhanced connectivity 
experienced between social media users has helped activate and deepen ties during uprisings, for 
instance during the ‘Arab Spring’. What is more, they have changed the democratic process and 
the nature of the public sphere. The debates surrounding the idea of the public sphere have taken 
a renewed interest with the emergence of new online media and social networks which can provide 
new communication spaces where debate can be conducted. Social media platforms are frequently 
used to call networked publics – publics that are constructed by networked technologies (boyd, 
2010, 2014) - into being and into action during periods of political instability. In regimes where 
media are controlled, inaccessible, or not trusted these platforms force a radical pluralisation of 
news dissemination and democratic processes (Dahlberg, 2009). But while much has been written 
about the power of networked protest in places like Turkey (Gezi Park protests) or Egypt (where 
social media sites became the tools of a protest movement that ultimately helped unseat the 
government), some commentators have analysed its weaknesses as well (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 
2016; Tufekci, 2017). 
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Indeed, populist groups are formed around social media networks and channel their anger through 
these online spaces. Each one of us is provided with a device from which to circulate personal 
views, a way of reinforcing our subjectivity by differentiating ourselves from others by either 
rejecting or accepting what already exists in social media platforms. In this sense, social media do 
not encourage the formation of a rational, informed deliberation, for they inflect and magnify an 
irrational public mood where “chaotic enterprises are trapped in a daily staging where ethos, pathos 
and logos are all mixed up” (Paparachissi, 2015: 26). These online spaces, populated by publics 
whose actions are motivated by shared feelings, contrast sharply with the traditional Habermasian 
public sphere, a space where informed public dialogue is supposed to take place. While not 
ignoring that the mainstream media have been criticised for their failure to realise the ‘ideal’ public 
sphere, social networks, blogs and websites go a step further by serving to interact in isolation with 
those who already think what we think (Sunstein, 2008). Rational persuasion is therefore 
weakened, while so-called ‘affective persuasion’ becomes prevalent. Common people become the 
recipient - but also transmitters - of deceptively simple messages that invoke political terms heavily 
invested with symbolic meaning and emotional valence (Maldonado, 2017).  
 
There has also been a change of the relationship between political actors and citizens. This includes 
a more direct communication between populist leaders and their base, the creation of channels that 
sideline those of the mainstream media, as well as the emergence of ‘post-truth’ as a framework 
that gives new value to narratives as conveyors of political values that disrupt established social 
conventions (Maldonado, 2017). The populist approach has served well a number of political 
leaders that have defied the establishment, with the most noticeable achievements being Brexiteers 
and the rise of Donald Trump, but also the appearance of populist underpinnings that defy liberal 
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democracies in countries such as Poland, Hungary and Turkey. What is interesting is the way in 
which populism functions and spreads with the help of social media networks in order to mobilize 
political emotions. Indeed, contemporary populism boosted by the social media exploits both the 
public sphere and disrupts individual realities. Although hardly a new phenomenon, populism and 
its political performance can facilitate the deployment of political emotions in the networked 
public sphere through social media technologies. The new public sphere allows citizens to act as 
co-creators of opinion since they can generate and distribute online content (through blogs, 
webpages, and so on) that can be shared with others (Castells, 2009). In turn, populist leaders take 
advantage of the digitization of the public sphere and present themselves as allies to people, or as 
leading a ‘movement’ rather than a party. 
 
The EU Referendum which led to the Brexit decision in 2016 was accompanied by the populist 
online narrative. The social media echo-chamber tended to reinforce the anti-European rhetoric 
within the mainstream media led by a chorus of Brexit-led newspapers and Leave campaigners.  
There is a certainly a continued relevance of mainstream/legacy media with social media as an 
‘echo chamber’ in the case of Brexit, and this also applies to other examples, such as Fox News as 
a key ‘inspiration’ for Donald Trump! In the case of Brexit, anti-immigrant sentiment was fuelled 
by the view that dysfunctional European elite was bent on undermining Britain’s economy, 
sovereignty and self-confidence across both the social and established media.. This led to the 
xenophobic falsehoods claiming that a Vote Leave outcome would Canute-like turn back the 
‘waves’ of immigrants who were ready to pounce from Eastern Europe and the Syrian refugee 
crisis (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2018). A large-scale social media data analysis (see 
http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-7-social-media/impact-
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of-social-media-on-the-outcome-of-the-eu-referendum/) demonstrates that not only did Brexit 
supporters have a more powerful and emotional message, but they were also more effective in the 
use of social media like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. A combination of factors, such as the 
more intuitive and straightforward messaging by the Leave campaign (which is crucial for social 
media campaigning) and the highly emotionally charged nature of messages (which facilitated the 
viral spread of Leave ideas) led to the activation of a greater number of Leave followers at 
grassroots level, something that eventually influenced many undecided voters. 
 
In tandem, Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign for the Republican nomination for President and his 
General Election challenge against Democratic nominee Hilary Clinton for the Presidency has 
been seen as an expression of political leadership via the interface of social media platforms. 
Trump, the property tycoon and reality television star, propelled his candidacy through a 
purposefully controversial spectacle of outlandish and hateful commentary and bravado. He 
constructed a deliberate news agenda through his social media and campaign appearances. 
Trump’s twitter handle itself- @realDonaldTrump - directly communicates the idea that the 
content presented is genuine and unfiltered. His syntactical choices similarly foster a sense of 
immediacy and connection; he regularly uses first person address, referring to himself as ‘I’ and 
audiences as ‘you.’ Trump also employs words such as ‘together’ and ‘we’ to suggest a shared 
responsibility and interaction between himself and his followers (for instance, “if we have no 
border, we have no country”). He consistently thanks his supporters in tweets, like “thank you 
America!.Together we will #MAGA [Make America Great Again].” Trump’s “thank you” posts 
create a sense of personal, direct connection between the candidate and his supporters (Iosifidis 
and Wheeler, 2018). But perhaps the trope that Trump employs most frequently in order to make 
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a case for his sincerity is that of identifying, pointing to, or calling out instances of insincerity as 
he sees them. Many of his posts are accusatory and he condemns everyone from reporters to media 
outlets, to former employees and, of course, his opponent as “crooked,” “rigged,” “made up,” 
“biased,” and “corrupt.” His favoured moniker for Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton was 
“Crooked Hillary,” a phrase that marks her as inauthentic and insincere while bolstering his own 
professed transparency. Trump’s smart use of Twitter creates a bond between followers and 
leaders that befits populist strategies. Whereas the anti-establishment discourse of populism entails 
a distrust of mainstream media and conventional politicians, social networks make it easier for 
populist movements to feed their followers with their own news (Maldonado, 2017). Jair 
Bolsanaro’s 2018 political campaign in Brazil echoed US President Trump’s nationalist focus on 
making Brazil, in this case, great again. 
 
As the internet rapidly expanded, the new communications formats offered other politicians too 
with greater opportunities to reconfigure their campaign strategies and secure high levels of 
visibility, including left-wing ones. For instance, the current UK Labour party leader Jeremy 
Corbyn, with his ‘un-celebrity’ celebrity performance and unlikely ascendancy from Parliamentary 
backbencher to political leadership has shown how an ‘outsider’ politician could effect a political 
reversal by galvanizing his ‘affective capacities’ into the mainstream of politics. The construction 
of a social movement via Momentum, a left-wing British political organisation, has been 
instrumental to Corbyn’s organizational success and political legitimacy. Most especially, for 
Corbyn’s supporters and even in more hostile arenas within the mainstream media, he has been 
seen as a figure of ‘authenticity’ for both good and bad. This has occurred against the prevailing 
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norms amongst the political elites whose previous responses had been to ‘triangulate’ their 
approaches to the electorate to say as little as possible they could about ideology.  
 
The Corbyn phenomenon demonstrates the blurring of the lines between political insiders and 
outsiders in the social media age. The ways in which politicians present themselves to the public, 
coupled with advancements in digital technologies, facilitated new ways for politicians to enhance 
their fame. As Corbyn’s ascendancy to political leadership in 2016 has operated in the vacuum in 
the centre-left political narrative with the collapse of the credibility of the Blairist settlement of the 
‘Third Way’, this had foundered as a legitimate political response in an era of economic austerity, 
anti-globalisation and populist nationalism. In direct contrast to Trump, Corbyn’s ‘uncelebrity’ 
political performativity and narrative referred to his genuine beliefs to define his leadership and to 
establish a rapport with the public. This has gone hand-in-hand with the incorporation of the social 
media into his leadership and election campaigns, along with his para-social linkages with the 
electorate.  
 
Social Media and Post-Truth Politics  
 
Social media have also become platforms for the rapid circulation of what has become known as 
‘Fake News’ (Wardle, 2017). There has been considerable focus in the context of both the 2016 
US Presidential election and the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership as to what extent fake 
news had an influence on the outcomes (Iosifidis and Andrews, 2019). The Twitter output of the 
successful US Presidential candidate Donald Trump and the Brexit campaign in the UK, whose 
repeated focus on xenophobic claims about Turkish citizens and their likely entitlement to enter 
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the UK, coupled with the false pledge about Brexit leading to an additional £350 million per week 
for the NHS, were widely spread on digital media (Cummings, 2017). In particular, the EU 
referendum showed that social media tools can be used to shape the public agenda, form public 
opinion and drive social change – for better or for worse. In parallel with Trump’s sensational 
victory, the vote for Brexit was secured in what has been dubbed the era of ‘post-truth politics’ 
largely based on fake news, the misuse of statistics and appeals to emotion rather than policies and 
facts. In this capacity, hybrid media and online discourses constructed a potent ‘politics of fear’ 
which impacted on the UK electorate’s political thinking. It may yet prove a costly game for the 
British people and the rest of the EU citizens. One worrying trend in the new world is that 
stretching the truth can be seen as just part of a game. European leaders are struggling to absorb 
the impact of Internet-spread fake news on balloting around the world as the continent faces a 
series of elections during 2017 that will reshape its future. Post-truth in politics is one of the drivers 
of populism and it is one of the threats to democracy (AUTHORS). 
 
Undoubtedly fake news is profitable, for there are economic advantages for producers of fake news 
relating to the level of engagement that social media users undertake (Tambini, 2017). Fake news 
websites can generate revenue for their creators by raising sums from advertising on their sites 
through, for example, Google Adsense or through Facebook advertising on their Pages. There is 
an industrialisation of fake news in certain quarters, with what can be termed ‘troll factories’ 
(Stahle, 2017), and also the use of propaganda bots on social media. More likes, more shares, and 
more clicks lead to more money for advertisers and platforms (Tambini, 2017). The way in which 
Facebook’s algorithm works has contributed to this process. Facebook’s aim was to ensure people 
stayed on the platform as long as possible — and that meant their News Feed needed to be 
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‘interesting and relevant’ — and in practice that meant reinforcing their views, not confronting 
them. Facebook’s News Feed algorithm, regularly updated, took into account thousands of factors 
to determine what shows up in any one user’s. As news stories are spread by other Facebook users, 
knowledge of the original news source diminishes radically and this is not surprising, since there 
is no branding difference in the Facebook News Feed between fake news sites and established and 
respected news outlets. In the same vein, Page Rank, an algorithm used by Google Search to rank 
websites in their search engine results, decrease the diversity of news sources that people see, 
reinforcing confirmation bias and contributing to what has been called a ‘filter bubble’ effect 
(Iosifidis and Andrews, 2019). 
 
These types of engagement with social media are highly questionable in preserving political 
consensus and have exposed the deficiencies in modern democracies. Therefore, from these 
examples, a mixed picture has occurred with regard to the usage of online techniques in 
representative democracies and there are still many questions about whether they actually 
encourage a greater form of public efficacy. Most observers today concur that especially in regard 
to social media, modern communication technologies have impacted profoundly on politics and 
participation. But the problem is that there is still no overarching agreement in terms of how and 
to what extent this impact takes place, and what significance it has for democratic politics. In the 
cases of Trump’s Twitter strategy both in his campaign (and within the early period of his 
Presidency) and the use of social media by Brexiteers, it is clear that the social media engagement 
has been highly controversial in relation to democratic deficits and that the usage of online 
techniques has left open questions as to whether democratic consensus can be achieved.  
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This is not the place to identify potential solutions to the above concerns, but it would be suffice 
to say that some noticeable research work has been conducted with regards to overseeing social 
media. Wu (2016) argued that social media like Facebook should serve the public (rather than their 
own interests) by becoming ‘public benefit corporations’. Napoli and Caplan (2017) favoured the 
articulation of new or modified frameworks that reflect the hybrid nature of social media platforms 
– content producers, but also investors in platforms for connectivity (Iosifidis and Andrews, 2019) 
called for a new category of ‘information utilities’ which would encompass truly dominant internet 
intermediaries such as Facebook and Google. But more ideas are needed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have argued that the phenomenon of globalisation is currently being challenged 
by the rise of populism and nationalism, as part of a reaction against the global liberal policies of 
the last three decades in many regions of the world. The paper examined some possible reasons 
for the rise of nationalism and populism, ranging from economic issues relating to the global 
economic slowdown, cultural factors and value shifts, inequality, uncertainty and the rise of 
immigration, all of which lower support for globalisation. In effect, more and more societies draw 
on nationalism of some sort to define relations between the state, the citizen and the world beyond 
the nation. A striking example is US President Donald Trump, who promised the American people 
withdrawal from multilateral trade treaties, a wall on the Mexican border, and deportation of illegal 
immigrants, in order to “Make America Great Again”. Britain’s vote in 2016 to leave the EU was 
also the result of a nationalist turn. Anticipating Trump, the Brexiteers’ main slogan was “we want 
our country back.” Elsewhere in Europe, nationalism is rising and populist, predominantly right-
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wing political parties are united in the belief that each individual country should do what is best 
for its own sovereignty, rather than build co-operative relations between countries. Traces of the 
same trend can be found in the BRICS and other developing countries. Jair Bolsanaro of the far-
right PSL party won the 2018 election by taking a populist stance and promising to “make Brazil 
great again”. 
 
Looking beyond these immediate phenomena, we need to consider the extent to which 
globalisation and nationalism are not necessarily polarised discourses. Contrary to the ‘alt-right’ 
critiques of globalism as an ideological movement opposed to the nation-state, it is important to 
reiterate that global economic expansion, and the development of legal and institutional 
frameworks that enable international trade, investment and the movement of people, have for the 
most part been promoted by nation-states, with national governments perceiving greater 
integration to be in their economic interests. The rise of Trump has not led to a decline in U.S. 
trade with the rest of the world, nor has Brexit been associated with economic protectionism: by 
contrast, a major strand of argument for leaving the European Union has been that the U.K. can 
forge its own free trade agreements with other parts of the world, notably the U.S., India and China. 
The majority of right-populist parties in Europe do not seek to leave the European Union, but 
rather to see greater Europe-wide restrictions on migration from other parts of the world, notably 
Africa and the Middle East, and there is considerable evidence that they have influenced EU 
migration policy accordingly.  
 
There are therefore limits, as Norris and Ingelhart (2019) have argued, to viewing the rise of 
populism as being associated with demands for alternative economic policies, although this is most 
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characteristic of left-populist movements. Further research on populism and globalisation will 
need to give attention to the relationship between ‘territorial’ and ‘non-territorial’ identities – those 
defined primarily by the nation-state and national identity and those defined by identities or 
principles not primarily linked to national identity, such as feminism, environmentalism, LGBT 
rights, human rights, and the rights of racial, ethnic and religious groups. Two important research 
questions are the extent to which nationalist movements have adopted an ‘identitarian’ frame (e.g. 
a ‘white’ or ‘European’ identity), and the extent to which the rise of competing populisms is in 
itself a contestation around the meaning of nationalism and national identity: inclusive or exclusive 
framing of national identity, and majoritarian or multicultural definitions of the nation-state? 
 
The other major issue rising is around social media and politics. Until relatively recently, much of 
the academic literature focused on the benefits of social media for social movements and unrests 
like the “Arab Spring”, and the potential their offered for networked and post-institutional forms 
of political mobilisation (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Castells, 2012). In this paper, we have drawn 
attention to the extent to which social media platforms are being used by anti-democratic, 
authoritarian or ultra-nationalist forces. At one level, this may be both predictable and healthy:  
tools and technologies can be adopted by all sides in political communication, and the exposure to 
a diversity of views on social media such as Twitter and Facebook open up opportunities for 
dialogue and difference.  What we have found is that new communication tools also accelerate the 
spread of nationalism, by allowing people to organise in groups and rallies with others who also 
lost faith in global free-market capitalism, and despised the government for not shielding them 
from its depredations. While this can be seen as the ‘democratisation of voice’ as people and 
messages can bypass the traditional gatekeepers of the mainstream media, it has also opened up a 
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pathway to electoral success that can be based upon misinformation and even disinformation, 
propaganda and ‘fake news’. Benkler, Faris and Roberts (2018) identified the extent of this in the 
2016 U.S. presidential elections, observing the wider risks to democracy and pluralism from not 
only the rapid online circulation of such disinformation by motivated political actors, but also the 
prospect of ‘echo chambers’ where citizens are no longer exposed to the viewpoints of their 
adversaries, except in the most crudely caricatured ways.  
 
This means that political engagement through social media has exposed the fissures in modern 
democracies, and there is the risk of a feedback loop operating between political polarisation, 
misinformation, the accumulation of user attention and engagement on politically preferred online 
sites, and the impossibility of consensus on core policy issues. The crisis of expertise is connected 
to this, as all information is potentially politicised and rendered able to be motivated by malign 
intent (Waisbord, 2018). Therefore, from the examples presented above, a mixed picture has 
occurred with regard to the usage of online techniques in democratic societies and there are still 
many questions about whether they actually encourage a greater form of public efficacy. It is clear 
that social media engagement has been highly controversial in relation to democratic deficits, and 
that more research needs to be conducted with regards to the connection between social media, 
populism and ‘post-truth’ politics. 
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